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THE STATUS OF THE GULF OF SIRTE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Francesco Francioni *
I. INTRODUCTION

Among the many sources of strain and conflict that have arisen
between states throughout the development of the law of the sea,
coastal states' claims of jurisdiction over adjacent seas and sea-bed
areas are perhaps the single most important category. Fisheries
disputes and problems related to the delimitation of the continental shelf account for by far the largest number of incidents. One
need only check the record starting with the early precedent of
the Fisheries Case 1 of 1951 and ending with the most recent judgment in the Gulf of Maine2 case in 1984.
An equally serious source of tension between maritime powers
and coastal states, however, is connected to the parallel phenomenon
of the increasingly liberal use of straight baselines and the
widespread resort to the theory of historic titles to justify the closing of large bodies of adjacent waters and bays. To date, reactions
to this phenomenon, and particularly to the latter practice, have
been limited to protests or other diplomatic steps intended to prevent acquiescence. By contrast, with respect to the Gulf of Sirte,
the United States deemed it necessary-or advisable-to accompany the act of protest with a show of force which took the form
of military maneuvers in the proximity of the contested area. As
is known, this attempt caused open armed conflict resulting in the
downing of two Libyan planes by jet fighters of the United States
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.3
*Professor of International Law, University of Siena, Italy; Visiting Professor Cornell Law School.
1. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgment of Dec. 18).
2. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 1 (unofficial) (Judgment of Oct. 12).
3. This article will not examine the legal issues connected to the use of force for the
purpose of enforcing navigational rights or coastal states' claims over sea areas. For an
analysis of these issues see Francioni, The Gulf of Sirte Incident and International Law, 5
ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 85 (1980-81); Adam, L 'incidente <kl Golfo <Ulla Sirte, 64 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE (RIV. DIR. INT.) 1025 (1981); Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis of
Libya's Claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT. L.J. 65 (1983).
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In view of the dangerous potential for military escalation that
such precedent suggests, it seems important to analyze the legal
status of the Gulf of Sirte. At this juncture indeed several countries, foremost among them the United States, maintain an attitude
of non-recognition of the Libyan claim.
The legal issues to be addressed in this paper are the following: 1) Is the closing of the Gulf of Sirte justifiable under the Geneva
Convention of 1958,4 the Montego Bay Convention of 1982,5 as well
as customary international law? 2) To what extent is the straight
baseline method recognized in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case, 6 as well as in the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, 7 applicable to
the entirety of the Gulf of Sirte? 3) And, finally, is this gulf subject to a regime of appropriation by virtue of historic titles or vital
interests that may be claimed by Libya? The following discussion
shall also attempt to develop a criterion of transitional law intended
to determine the limits of standing for coastal states' claims which
are neither generally recognized nor so completely arbitrary and
capricious as to constitute a prime facie violation of international
law.

II. THE ORIGIN AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE LIBYAN
CLAIM
The Gulf of Sirte was unilaterally proclaimed an integral part
of Libyan territory by the Declaration of October 10, 1973.8 This
act purported to enclose the waters of the Gulf within a straight
line of approximately 300 miles connecting the two parts of the coast
at the cities of Benghazi and Misurata at a latitude of 32 degrees
and 30 minutes north. 9 The United States was notified of the
Declaration by a note from the Libyan Embassy in Washington to
the Department of State on October 11, 1973. 10 On October 19, 1973,
4. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter
cited as 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea].
5. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1893), reprinted in 21l.L.M.1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as 1982 Convention].
6. Fisheries Case, supra note 1.
7. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4; 1982 Convention, supra note
5.
8. Declaration of Oct. 10, 1973, reprinted in Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An
Analysis of Libya's Claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 65, 67-68 (1983).
9. See Rousseau, Chronique des faits internationaux, 78 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (R. G. DR. INT. P.) 1177 (1974).
10. Letter from Libya to the United States (October 11, 1973).
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the Declaration was sent to the United Nations in a Note Verbale
which justified the closing based on "security interests" as well as
sovereign rights and possession exercised over the area for a long
time. A regime of prior authorization was made mandatory for
foreign vessels that intended to navigate in the area of the Gulf.
The United States Government did not reply immediately.
However, on February 11, 1974, 11 a note of protest was addressed
to Libya in which the claim over the Gulf of Sirte was declared
"unacceptable and a violation of international law." 12 The following passage from the note illustrates the arguments made by the
Department of State to challenge the legality of the Libyan
proclamation:
Under international law, as codified in the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the body of waters enclosed
in this line (the straight line closing the Gulf of Sirte) cannot be
regarded as the juridical internal or territorial waters of the
Libyan Arab Republic. Nor does the Gulf of Sirte meet the international law standards of past, open, notorious and effective exercise of authority, continuous exercise of authority, and acquiescence
of foreign nations necessary to be regarded historically as Libyan
internal or territorial waters. The United States Government views
the Libyan action as an attempt to appropriate a large area of the
high seas by unilateral action, thereby encroaching upon the long
established principle of freedom of the seas. This action is particularly unfortunate when the international community is engaged
in intensive efforts to obtain broad international agreement on law
of the sea issues, including the nature and extent of coastal state
jurisdiction. Unilateral actions of this type can only hinder the process of achieving an accommodation of the interests of all nations
at the Law of the Sea Conference.
In accordance with the position stated above, the United
States Government reserves its rights and the rights of its nationals in the area of the Gulf of Sirte affected by the action of
the Government of Libya. 13

Regarding the entire correspondence by the U.S. Department
11. Letter from the United States to Libya (February 11, 1974).
12. Id.
13. A. ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293 (1974).
France and the United Kingdom protested while Italy presented "reservations" on the legality
of the closing of the Gulf of Sirte in a note delivered by the Libyan charge d'affaires in Rome.
See Statement of Mr. Bensi, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, reprinted in 2
ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 422 (1976).
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of State, the United States' claim appears to be based on the following legal points: 1) The status of a bay or gulf cannot be determined
by unilateral acts of the coastal state but must conform to international norms in order to be recognized by other states; 2) The
delimitation of the Gulf of Sirte was not consistent with the 1958
Geneva Convention; 3) The closing of the Gulf was not consistent
with general international law.
As to the first point, the United States position is, needless
to say, entirely correct. As was stated by the International Court
of Justice in the Fisheries Case, "[t]he delimitation of the sea areas
has always had an international aspect; it cannot be dependent
merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its
municipal law." 14 The Court added in this case that "[a]lthough ...
the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only
the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the
delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international
law." 15 In light of this Libya was not free to unilaterally determine
the sea boundary of the Gulf of Sirte, but was under an obligation
to set the boundary in accordance with applicable rules of both
conventional and customary international law.
The relevant conventional rules on the closing of bays or gulfs
are contained in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone. 16 Article 711 of this Convention, which deals
with bays "the coast of which belong to a single State," 18 provides
a double test for the validity of the closing of the bay. First, the
maximum distance between the entrance points of the bay cannot
be greater than twenty-four miles; 19 second, the body of waters to
be enclosed as a bay must have an area as large as, or larger than,
that of the semi-circle whose diameter is represented by the line
joining the entrance points of the indentation. 20
The Gulf of Sirte does not meet either of these two technical
criteria. The closing line established by the 1973 Libyan Declaration is almost 300 miles, 22 therefore far exceeding the twenty-four
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Fisheries Case, supra note 1, at 116, 132.
Id. at 132.
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1.
Id. art. 7.
Id.
Id. art. 7(4).
Id. art. 7(2).
21. Id. art. 7(4).
22. 1973 Declaration, supra note 8.
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mile limit laid down in Article 7(4) of the 1958 Geneva Convention.23
Furthermore, adopting such a closing line results in the sea area
claimed by Libya being considerably smaller than the area of the
semi-circle having such line as its diameter, so as not to be capable
of satisfying the requirement laid down in Article 7(2) either.24
However, while the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone 26 is applicable to the United States, which
ratified it on April 12, 1961, it is not binding on Libya, who has
not ratified it. 26 It is obvious, therefore, that the provisions of the
1958 Convention are not relevant in determining the legality of
Libya's action, unless their normative content is proved to be
declaratory of customary international law. The view advanced by
the United States in its note of 1974 protesting the Libyan claim,
in so far as it made reference to "international law as codified in
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea,"27 seems to point in this
direction. What, then, is the state of customary international law
on the subject?
State practice and pronouncements by scholars with regard
to the problem of delimiting bays show remarkable dynamism in
the sense of reflecting a consistent evolution of powers on behalf
of the coastal state. From the early doctrine of inter fauces terrarum
formulated by Grotius, 28 the criteria adopted have included the
defensibility of the opening by reference to a cannon shot,29 the
range of vision from headland to headland,80 the six-mile and later
the ten-mile rule, 31 to finally the formalization of the twenty-four
1958 Convention on the Territorial Seas, supra note 1, art. 7(4).
Id. art. 7(2).
1958 Convention on the Territorial Seas, supra note 1.
See UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES: TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
REGISTERED OR FILED AND RECORDED WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 565 (1980).
27. See A. RO VINE, supra note 13.
28. This doctrine states that "a bay or gulf can only be territorial if it is not so large
that when compared with the land surrounding it, it cannot be considered to be a part of
it." GROTIUS, II DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625).
29. See VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS 129 (1754). For an early critique of this view, see
FAUCHILLE. TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 372 (1925).
30. This criterion was adopted in an early American case, Commonwealth v. Peters,
12 Met. 387 (1847), in which it was held that the waters of a bay were territorial because
they were "not so wide by that persons and objects on the other side can be discerned by
the naked eye by persons on the opposite side." Id. at 392.
31. For the six and ten mile rules see the literature cited in L.J. BouCHEZ. THE REGIME
OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (1964); STROHL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 5 (1963).
Some authors exclude the existence of a general rule concerning the maximum length of
closing lines in bays. See GIULIANO, I DIRITTI E GLI OBBLIGHI DEGLI STATI 225 (1956);
23.
24.
25.
26.
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mile rule of the 1958 Geneva Convention.32
Perhaps the most serious attempt to formulate a generally
acceptable rule on the subject was the one undertaken by the special
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, Fran~ois, with
the help of a Committee of Experts which met at the Hague in April
of 1953. The Committee was invited to clarify which technical conditions were to be satisfied for an indentation or curve in the
coastline to qualify as a bay.
The Report of the Committee 33 built its definition of a juridical
bay around two basic criteria. The first concerned the relationship
between the width of the mouth of the bay and the area of its
waters. This criterion is contained in the semi-circle test. The second criterion concerned the maximum length of the closing line
which was set according to the criterion of the range of vision, that
is, at ten miles. While the semi-circle rule was followed by the Commission in drafting the Article on bays and eventually became part
of Article 7 of the Geneva Convention,34 the ten-mile limit for the
closing line enjoyed scarce support in the Commission. Thus the
1955 draft Article came to contain a maximum closing limit of
twenty-five miles.
Many governments, however, commenting on the draft Articles
considered the proposed twenty-five mile limit excessive. Among
them were Brazil, Egypt and Israel,35 with one group of statesBelgium, Great Britain and the United .States36 -expressing a clear
preference for the ten-mile limit. Legal opinion on the matter,
therefore, seemed to indicate that the maximum closing line of a
bay should have been fixed at some intermediate point between
ten and twenty-five miles. The Commission, indeed, acknowledged
this by redrafting Article 7 on bays and fixing the maximum length
of the closing line at fifteen miles. This was done allegedly to find
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 328 (3d ed. 1956) SUY, LES GOLFES ET LES BAIES EN
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC Ill (1957); QUADRI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO 681 (5th ed.
1968). For a precedent supporting the view of these authors, see the judgment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 1910 in the North Atlantic Fisheries Case (U.S. v. U.K.),
Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 141 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1916), which found that no mandatory rule of
international law existed on the matter.
32. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4.
33. This report is published as an annex to Fran~ois, Addendum to the Second Report
on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, re-printed in (1953) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 75.
34. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 7.
35. Fran~ois , Regime of the High Seas and the Territorial Sea, (1956) 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
CoMM'N 40-41, 43, 52, 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4199/Add.1.
36. Id. at 80, 91, 94.
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a compromise between, on the one hand, the group of states which,
because they supported the three-mile limit of the territorial sea
had upheld the ten-mile limit in their treaty practice concerning
bays, and on the other, the group of states that were pressing for
an increase in the breadth of the territorial sea. The latter group
was, as is now known, the winning side. And so the Article on bays
prepared by the International Law Commission was finally adopted
at the Geneva Convention with the amendment that increased the
limit to twenty-four miles.
Even, however, if it is possible to concede that such a twentyfour mile limit presented in 1958 an act of "progressive development" rather than of pure codification, in view of the relative
strength of the ten-mile supporters, subsequent practice seems to
show a consolidation of the twenty-four mile closing width of bays.
First of all, it must be recognized that such strenuous supporters
of the lower limit as the United States and Great Britain ratified
the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea without reservations
as to the part of Article 7 concerning bays.37
Secondly, official policy statements made in the post-1958
period by countries previously following the ten-mile rule show a
shift to the twenty-four mile rule. The Secretary of State of the
United States, for instance, wrote to Attorney General R. Kennedy
on January 15, 1963 that with respect to the delimitation of Bristol
Bay in Alaska, the rule set in the Geneva Convention, although not
yet in force, was to be "regarded in view of its adoption by a large
majority of the States of the world the best evidence of international
law on the subject at the present time." 38
Further, some important judicial cases brought before
municipal courts of countries that in the past had consistently relied
on the ten-mile rule show adherence to the twenty-four mile limit
as a general principle of international law. This happened, for instance, in some American cases involving a conflict between federal
and state jurisdiction over bays.39 In this context, the United States
37. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES, supra note 26, at 567.
38. This letter is reprinted in WHITEMAN, IV DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LA w 230 (1965).
39. See particularly, United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975) concerning the
delimitation of "Florida Bay" which, according to the Special Masters Report, could not be
regarded as a juridical bay in its entirety but only with respect to its eastern portion, that
is "east of a closing line running southwesterly from East Cape of Cape Sable to Knight
Key in the Florida Keys, at a distance of approximately 24 geographical Miles." The Territorial Sea Limits, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 2 (1974).
For other United States _precedents on bays, see United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139
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judicial authorities were obviously under no obligation to apply the
twenty-four mile criterion qua conventional law. The fact that it
was found decisive in the particular case is to be interpreted as
the consequence of a corresponding determination that the twentyfour mile limit is a rule of customary international law. 4° Finally,
the consolidation of the twenty-four mile limit into international
practice is shown by the adoption of this rule as Article 10 of the
1982 Montego Bay Convention,41 reproducing in its relevant part
Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention.42
As far as customary international law is concerned, it is impossible to recognize the Libyan claim as consistent with the general
regime in force regarding the technical delimitation of bays. It is
therefore necessary to turn to an examination of other possible legal
grounds for the validity of the Libyan claim. These are the "straight
baselines method of delimitation" and the claim to a "historic" title
over the Gulf of Sirte.

III. IS THE "STRAIGHT BASELINES" METHOD
APPLICABLE TO THE GULF OF SIRTE?
Although the Libyan government does not appear to have made
express reference to the straight baseline method in its 1973 Declaration an examination of it is necessary in view of the unique legal
basis that it provides for the enclosure of internal waters which do
not technically qualify as "bays." Article 4 of the Geneva Convention43
and the 1951 precedent of the Fisheries Case" allow the closing off
of a body of adjacent waters independently of the twenty-four mile
limit and the semi-circle test, provided a certain number of conditions are met by the coastal state. The first condition concerns the
geographic character of the coastline which must be "deeply indented and cut into," 415 or possess "a fringe of islands along the
coast."48 The second relates to the general direction of the coast
from which the baseline must not depart to any appreciable extent.47
(1964), reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 889 (1965), modified 382 U.S. 448 (1966), modified, 432 U.S. 40
(1977); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 994, modified, 394 U.S.
l, modified, 394 U.S. 836 (1969).
40. United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. at 531.
41. 1982 Convention, supra note 5.
42. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4.
43. Id.
44. Fisheries Case, supra note 1.
45. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
46. Id.
47. Id. art. 4(2).
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The third concerns the link between the body of waters to be enclosed and the mainland. This link must be sufficiently close as to render
the waters under examination capable of being treated as internal.'8
Finally, Article 4(4), indicates as .a relevant factor the existence
of economic interests "peculiar to the region concerned, the reality
and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage." 49
These conditions have been confirmed, with some additions, in the
text of Article 7 of the 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 50 so that it is reasonable to assume that they represent
generally accepted standards of international law.
Is the drawing of a straight line across the Gulf of Sirte consistent with these standards? An examination of the Libyan
coastline shows that it is neither deeply indented nor cut into around
the Gulf of Sirte, and that there is no fringe of islands present.
Rather, the Gulf is characterized by one large recess in the coast
whose opening is approximately 300 miles.
The closing line also departs from the direction of the coast.
Indeed, it has the effect of macroscopically rounding off the profile of the African coast. As for the condition concerning sufficiently
close links of the waters landward of the baseline with the land
domain, it could perhaps at least be conceded that the deeper portion of the Gulf satisfies this condition. With respect to the economic
interests relevant to the region concerned, although they may have
been a factor in the decision of the Libyan government, they were
not identified at the time of the 1973 Declaration, nor was any
evidence of long usage given as required by Article 4(4) of the
Geneva Convention 51 and Article 7(5) of the Montego Bay
Convention.52
As can be seen, the conditions for the drawing of straight
baselines are only partially met in the case of the Gulf of Sirte. Thus,
there is ample reason for doubt about the admissibility of such
baselines, particularly in relation to the geographic conditions of
the Libyan coast. The use of the word "doubt" is particularly appropriate because of the lack of legal precision in the abovedescribed criteria concerning admissibility of baselines. It is submitted that this lack of precision has led to a "liberal interpreta48. Id. art. 4(4).
49. Id. Reference to economic interests as one of the relevant factors justifying the
employment of straight baselines was first contained in the Fisheries Case, supra note 1,
at 116, 142.
50. 1982 Convention, supra note 5.
51. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4.
52. 1982 Convention, supra note 5.
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tion" of the same criteria with a resulting departure in state practice from those conditions which originally justified, such as in the
case of the Norwegian coast, the employment and subsequent
recognition of the method. 53 A recent example of state practice
which reflects the adoption of "exaggerated" baselines is the Italian
Decree of April 26, 1977 ,54 proclaiming both the closing of all the
major gulfs of the peninsula, despite the fact that the width of their
entrances exceeds 55 the twenty-four mile limit, and the drawing of
straight lines around the Tuscan archipelago and the perimeter of
the two islands of Sicily and Sardinia.
But even if one were to overcome these doubts and concede
that the system of straight baselines was admissible, this would
not involve the right of the coastal state to exclude innocent
passage. Article 5(2) of the Geneva Convention provides that "where
the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Article 4 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which
previously had been considered as part of the territorial sea or of
the high seas, a right of innocent passage ... shall exist in those
waters." 51 Libya would not, therefore, have been in a position to
prohibit access and transit of foreign vessels although such prohibition would, arguably, be legitimate with respect to either
overflight or naval units engaged in any activity prejudicial to the
peace and security of the coastal state.57

IV. THE CLAIM TO AN "HISTORIC" TITLE
In view of the doubts arising over the compatibility of the present regime of international law with the drawing of a 300-mile-long
straight baseline across the Gulf of Sirte, it is necessary to consider the question of the "historic" character of the Gulf as a possible
ground for the validity of the Libyan claim.
Article 7(6) of the Geneva Convention provides that the general
criteria for the delimitation of bays "shall not apply to so-called
53. For state practice concerning liberal interpretation of the straight baselines method,
see WHITEMAN, supra note 38, at 137; PEARCY. Geographical Aspects of the Law of the Sea, in
ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 1, 11 (1959).
54. Decree No. 816 of Apr. 26, 1977, 305 GAZZ. UFF. ITAL. (Nov. 9, 1977). For a critical
comment, see Adam, Un Nuovo Provvedimento in Materia di Linee di Ba.<;e Nel Mare Territoriale Italiano, 61 RIV. DIR. INT. 470 (1978).
55. The Gulfs of Venice, Manfredonia, Salerno, Squillace and Taranto.
56. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
57. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 14(4); 1982 Convention,
supra note 5, art. 19(2).
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'historic' bays." 58 This exception is relevant to the dispute over the
Gulf of Sirte because the 1973 Libyan Declaration118 contained, among
other things, a reference to centuries old "sovereign rights" having
been exercised by Libya over the Gulf.
The problem with this exception, which has been confirmed
in almost identical terms in Article 10(6) of the Montego Bay
Convention,80 is that no objective ·test is offered for determining
when a bay can be qualified as "historic." Indeed, all that exists
are some general international standards which have been set forth
in the past for determining the validity of the historic title claimed
over the bay. They are: 1) The effectiveness of the exercise of
powers over the bay; 2) The continuity of such exercise of powers
over a considerable period of time; and 3) The laek of objections
on the part of other states.81
These standards are also reflected in some important municipal
court decisions. Among them, the United States Supreme Court
decisions in United States v. Alaska,• which declared Alaska's claim
over Cook Inlet inadmissible, and United States v. Louisiana (1969)113
are of particular interest ..However, there is no trace of an explicit
recognition of these criteria in either the Montego Bay Convention"
nor its preparatory works. In addition, the latter show that the problem of historic bays and historic waters, in general, has been almost
ignored and that a proposal advanced in 1976 by Colombia in effect
adopting the above-mentioned standards was quickly discarded. 85
58. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 4, art. 7(6).
59. 1973 Declaration, supra note 8.
60. 1982 Convention, supra note 5, art. 10(6).
61. Cf. GIDEL. III LE 0ROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 635 (1932-1934); BoURQUIN,
LES BAIES HISTORIQUES 43 (1952); L.J. BoUCHEZ. supra note 12, at 237; F. LAURIA. IL REGIME
GIURIDICO DELLE BAIE E DEi GOLFI 135 (1970).
62. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, rem'd, 519 F .2d 1376 (9th Cir.1975). In Alaska,
the Supreme Court relied on the criteria for determining the historical character of a bay
by the Office of Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State: "l. open, notorious and effective
exercise of authority over the area by the State claiming the rights; 2. continuous exercise
of authority; 3. acquiescence of foreign nations in the exercise of authority." Id. at 189. The
Court held that enforcement of fishing and wildlife regulations did not constitute sufficient
display of authority under criteria one and two. The Court also held that acquie.scence of
foreign nations does not mean simply the absence of protest but requires evidence that foreign
nations knew or reasonably should have known that the claim over the bay was being
asserted. Id. at 202.
63. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 11.
64. 1982 Convention, supra note 5.
65. See v THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS
202 (1977) [hereinafter cited as V UNCLOS Ill OFFICIAL RECORDS (1977)).
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To what extent, then, are these standards relevant for determining the status of the Gulf of _Sirte? There is little doubt that
a strict application of these criteria to the Gulf is quite unlikely
to produce a finding of historic title. Despite the rather naive
reference in the Libyan Declaration 86 to a centuries old display of
sovereignty, there is really no serious evidence to confirm that such
a display of sovereignty every existed, either during the Italian
domination over Libya and Tripolitania or before then, during the
Turkish Empire's domination over Libya. On the contrary, as far
as Italy is concerned, the 1973 Declaration87 was criticized in a manner which would have been completely out of place had Italy
somehow concurred in the past with the formulation of an historic
title over the Gulf of Sirte.•

V. THE THEORY OF "VITAL" BAYS
The problem, however, cannot be disposed of on the basis of
these considerations alone. In fact, it is quite indisputable that
within the mainstream of tendencies aimed at widening the limits
of coastal states' jurisdiction over adjacent waters, one recent practice has emerged strongly concerning the assertion of an exceptional
jus excludendi over large bays. That basis is one of alleged "vital''
interests founded on security or economic considerations arising
independently of any true historic title. This theory, better known
as the theory of "vital" bays, has been justified by newly independent states in order to combat the unfavorable situation which
would arise vis-a-vis long-established states due to the "incapacity"
of the former to rely upon history or a long passage of time to assert
claims over their adjacent waters. 69
This justification, however, is not without flaws. First, new states
can always invoke the history and practice of their predecessors to make
territorial claims~ Second, this theory implies that new states have the
capacity to appropriate exceptional maritime areas by instantaneous decisions based on their vital interests. Such a capacity seriously prejudices

66. See note 8.
67. Id.
68. For the Italian reactions, see Statement of Mr. Bensi, supra note. 13.
69. For a discussion of this view, see Summary Records of 318th Meeting, (1955) 1
Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 211, U.N. Doc. A/2693, ACN.4/90 and Add.1-5; A/CN.4/93; A/CN.4/L.54
(statement of Garcia Amador); BLUM. HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LA w 179, 241 (1965).
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those states who have acquired corresponding titles at the expense of
long practice and passage of time. Rather, then, than resting on strictly
legal grounds, the theory of "vital" bays seems to be "politically"
motivated by the widespread suspicion and even intolerance that has
been shown by many newly born states toward the traditional slow process of custom formation. The result, from a general point of view,
is a preference for agreements and codification. Moreover, with respect
to the particular problem here discussed, there is a preference for
unilateral acts soliciting the prompt recognition of other nations of the
interests asserted.
In any event, it seems doubtful the doctrine of "vital" bays may
be labeled as a radical and isolated Libyan doctrine. Similar claims have
been pressed by, among others, the Soviet Union with respect to the
Bay of Peter the Great, Argentina and Uruguay with respect to the very
extensive area of Rio de la Plata estuary, Panama with respect to the
Panamanian Gulf, and Australia, Gabon and Guinea with respect to
practically all the bays and gulfs of their coasts. 10
As previously mentioned, the Italian government has also asserted
exceptional claims over Italy's adjacent waters by closing the Gulf of
Taranto with a straight line of approximately 60 miles within which the
waters are considered internal. The Presidential Decree by which this
assertion of authority was effected referred to an historic title. 71
However, there is no serious evidence of historic titles over the area
which conforms to the traditional standards mentioned above. On the
contrary, the main factor behind the closing of this Gulf appears to
be to secure the Gulf from the unwelcome visits of non-NATO naval
units.
This also explains the apparent lack of protest on the part of foreign
nations. 12 NATO countries have no interest in challenging the Italian
action insofar as it benefits them as well. On the other hand, the Soviet
Union is not in a position to raise any legal issue on this matter since
70. For a survey of state claims, see Secretary General of the United Nations, Juridical
Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, (1962) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1; VII &
VIII NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LA w OF THE SEA (M. Nordquist, s. Houston & K.R. Simmonds
eds. 1980).
71. Presidential Decree No. 816, supra note 54.
72. Only the United Kingdom appears to have shown some concern about the Gulf
of Taranto. In 1981 the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, replied to a question raised
by Lord Kenneth that the British interpretation of the Geneva Convention was not consistent with the Italian Claim. The same reply, however, specified that NATO does not take
a position with respect to the territorial sea limits of its members. See Ronzitti, Is the Gulf
of Tarnnto an Historic Bay? 11 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COMM. 275 (1984).
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it was one of the forerunners in the trend toward making sweeping claims
over large bays, such as the Bay of Peter the Great facing Japan. 73

VI. TOWARD A RELATIVE APPROACH ON "HISTORIC"
BAYS
If judged in this dynamic context, the Libyan claim over the

Gulf of Sirte may not be qualified as a violation of international
law. By the same token, the Libyan claim cannot be considered in
itself as constituting an internationally valid title over the area.
Rather, it is the first step in the process of asserting a special regime
which may or may not be successfully established depending on a
range of considerations including the acquiescence of other states,
the extent of analogous claims advanced in international practice,
and the persistence of the Libyan claim itself in the future.
What one cannot overlook in this context is that the evolution
of the Law of the Sea in the past three decades has been marked
by the repeated assertion of claims based on special interests and
circumstances of a geographic, economic, or environmental nature.
Moreover, while strongly contested at the beginning, these claims
have actually prevailed over the competing general interest of the
freedom of the seas.
Besides the most obvious example of the straight baseline
method being sanctioned on the basis of special circumstances in
the Fisheries Case,1' one may recall the Canadian Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act of 1970.75 That Act created a 100-mile
exclusive zone which was at first protested by the major maritime
powers but later acquiesced to and finally recognized in Section
8 of the Montego Bay Convention. 76 To this should be added that
fishing zones were at first opposed, even by force, and then
challenged before the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries
73. This bay was claimed as national waters by a decision of the Council of Ministers
of the Soviet Union of July 20, 1957. The United States protested on August 12, 1957, and
again on August 20, 1958. France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Holland, Germany and Japan
also protested. See Rousseau, Not,es et Commentaires: Extension <Us Eaux Terri.t<rriales Sovieteques dans la Baie de Vladivostock, 62 R. G. DR. INT. P. 63 (1958); BUTLER, THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE LA w OF THE SEA 108 (1971 ). The Soviet Union replied on January 7, 1958, to the United
States protest contesting the arguments and rejecting its conclusions. See WHITEMAN, supra
note 38, at 255.
74. Fisheries Case, supra note 1.
75. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. Al (Supp. I 1970). For comments, see PHARAND, THE LAW OF THE
SEA OF THE ARCTIC WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CANADA (1983).
76. Cf. 1982 Convention, supra note 25, art. 294 concerning the admissibility of a pollution prevention zone in ice-covered areas.
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Jurisdiction Case, 11 but then were almost immediately followed by
combined assertion in state practice and UNCLOS III with the concept of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. The international law
of bays has been similarly influenced by this general trend. The
number and frequency of coastal states' claims in this regard shows
that the old concept of an historic bay is currently evolving into
a more flexible notion whose crucial elements are the bona fide assertion of state interests and the recognition of and acquiescence of
third states, rather that immemorial usage and the long passage
of time.
VII. THE ROLE OF RECIPROCITY
A "relative approach on historic bays" involves a certain degree
of legal uncertainty in the period of time before the definitive consolidation of title or, vice versa, before the definitive failure of it
by virtue of a generalized attitude of objection. This is precisely
the period in which the Gulf of Sirte incident occurred, and it is
precisely with respect to this period of time that it is necessary
to ask what rules, if any, govern the rela.tions between the claiming coastal state and other states. An answer to this question may
be found in the principle of reciprocity. In other words, at least on
an intertemporal basis, this principle would involve an obligation
to respect the Libyan claim by those states whose own domestic
legislation and international practice has proceeded to the assertion of similarly exceptional claims over their respective coasts. Conversely, no such obligation would exist for those states which abstain from pressing claims of a similar nature with respect to their
own bays or gulfs. 78
The application of this criterion to the Gulf of Sirte leads to
the interesting result that the Libyan claim is, indeed, indirectly
supported by the practice of other neighbouring Mediterranean
countries. Tunisia, for instance, has asserted territorial powers over
the Gulf of Ga bes, and Italy, as mentioned above, has closed the
entire Gulf of Taranto. Both countries' closings were allegedly made
on the basis of an historic title. In reality, however, since such an
historic title does not appear to have roots in the past, the basis

77. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25).
78. This is a specific application of Conforti's theory of reciprocity as one of the possible forms of peaceful self-defense ("forme non viol,ente, o meglio non belliche, di autotutela").
CONFORTI, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 270 (1982).
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is clearly national security considerations and interests which are
similar to those invoked by Libya in her 1973 Declaration.
As far as the United States is concerned, its 1974 challenge
of the Libyan claim is consistent with a very restrictive attitude
regarding the limits of the admissibility of historic bays. This attitude, which has been consistently expressed in executive positions
and judicial pronouncements at the highest level, renders the Libyan
claim unrecognized by and unenforceable against the United States,
at least at this formative stage in which the standard of reciprocity
is decisive.
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